Enhanced ABC costing for hospitals: directed expense costing

Space limitations do not allow a complete discussion of all the topics and many of the obvious questions that the preceding brief introduction to directed expense costing probably raised in the reader's mind. These include how errors in accounting practices like posting expenses to the wrong period are handled; and how the system automatically adjusts costs for expenses benefiting several periods but posted to the acquisition month. As was mentioned above, underlying this overtly simple costing method are a number of sophisticated and sometimes complex processes that are hidden from the normal user and designed to automatically protect the integrity and accuracy of the costing process. From a user's viewpoint, the system is straightforward, understandable, and easy to use and audit. From a software development perspective, it is not quite that effortless. By using a system that is understood by all users at all levels, these users can now communicate with each other in a new and effective way. This new communication channel only occurs after each user is satisfied as to the overall costing quality achieved by the process. However, not all managers or physicians are always happy that the institution is using this "understandable" cost accounting system. During one of the weekly meetings of a hospital's administrative council, complaints from several powerful department heads concerning the impact that the use of cost data was having on them were brought up for discussion. In defending the continued use of the system, one vice president stated to the group that cost accounting does not get any easier than this, or any less expensive, or any more accurate. The directed expense process works and works very well. Our department heads and physicians will have to come to grips with the accountably it provides us to assess their value to the hospital.     

Conditional and Unconditional Conservatism:Concepts and Modeling

We develop a model that captures the distinct natures of and interactions between conditional and unconditional conservatism. Under unconditional conservatism, the book value of net assets is understated due to predetermined aspects of the accounting process. Under conditional conservatism, book value is written down under sufficiently adverse circumstances, but not up under favorable circumstances. The specification of earnings provided by the model yields hypotheses about how unconditional conservatism and other factors preempt conditional conservatism and so affect the asymmetric response of earnings to positive and negative share returns, both current and lagged, documented by Basu (1995, “Conservatism and the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Rochester’ 1997, “The Conservatism Principle and the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 24, 3–37).This revised version was published online in August 2005 with a corrected cover date.     

How Banks' Value-at-Risk Disclosures Predict their Total and Priced Risk: Effects of Bank Technical Sophistication and Learning over Time

Using a sample of eight large commercial banks from 1994 to 2000, Jorion (2002) finds that banks' VaR disclosures for their trading portfolios predict trading income variability. We extend Jorion's findings using a larger sample of 17 banks from 1997 to 2002 reporting trading VaRs under FRR No. 48 (1997). We find that banks' trading VaRs have predictive power for trading income variability that increases with bank technical sophistication and over time. We find that banks' trading VaRs have predictive power for a bank-wide measure of total risk, return variability, and for two bank-wide measures of priced risk, beta and realized returns.     

Bank CEO materialism: Risk controls,culture and tail risk

We investigate how the prevalence of materialistic bank CEOs has evolved over time, and how risk management policies, non-CEO executives’ behavior and tail risk vary with CEO materialism. We document that the proportion of banks run by materialistic CEOs increased significantly from 1994 to 2004, that the strength of risk management functions is significantly lower for banks with materialistic CEOs, and that non-CEO executives in banks with materialistic CEOs insider trade more aggressively around government intervention during the financial crisis. Finally, we find that banks with materialistic CEOs have significantly more downside tail risk relative to banks with non-materialistic CEOs.     

Short-Sale Restrictions and Price Clustering: Evidence from SEC Rule 201

We provide a novel test of information-based theories of price clustering by examining trade, order, and the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) quote price clustering during periods when information is removed from the market. We use a natural experiment of short-sale restrictions resulting from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 201 to more effectively determine the impact of information on price clustering. We find evidence of increased price clustering for trades, orders, and NBBO prices during short-sale restrictions. Overall, our findings indicate that short-sale restrictions harm the price discovery process and lead to a reduction in market efficiency.     

Conservation finance and sustainable tourism: the acceptability of conservation fees to support the Tambopata National Reserve,Peru

Protected areas are key to the conservation of global biodiversity and ecosystem services; however, their success is contingent upon adequate funding. One possibility to increase funding for park management is to “sell” a wider suite of ecosystem services “produced” by protected areas, such as carbon sequestration. We conducted 420 tourist surveys to analyze willingness to pay (WTP) for ecosystem service benefits via a conservation fee in the Tambopata National Reserve in Peru. We also interviewed eight tour operators about their perceptions of the proposed fee. The average stated WTP was 15 USD. Sixty-six percent of tourists stated they would pay 10 USD or more, which, if actually paid, would have resulted in 318,000 USD for park management in 2015. Most respondents stated they would pay an additional fee if it supported biodiversity conservation or local ecosystem services, such as water, but less than 10% of tourists were motivated by carbon sequestration as a reason to pay the fee. Most tour operators supported the additional fee. Our findings suggest that tourists are willing to pay higher fees to support conservation but that interest in paying for additional ecosystem services from parks may not extend to global and intangible benefits such as carbon sequestration.     

Pro-market institutions and outward FDI of emerging market firms: An institutional arbitrage logic

We offer new theory and evidence regarding the effects of pro-market institutions on outward foreign direct investment (FDI) of emerging market firms (EMFs). Drawing on the logic of institutional arbitrage, we integrate the escapism and exploitation mechanisms of EMF internationalization into a unified theoretical context. We propose an inverted U-shaped relationship between host market-supporting institutions (MSI) and the investment scale of an EMF’s FDI project in the country, showing an escape-driven upward slope for low-to-medium MSI levels and an exploitation-driven downward slope for medium-to-high MSI levels. We supplement this main argument with two boundary conditions: the alleviating effect of home market liberalization (HML) and the strengthening effect of home government subsidies (HGS), demonstrating the coexistence and variation of pro- and anti- market institutions in an emerging market. Using information on 1,450 FDI projects conducted by 288 Chinese listed firms in 116 host countries, we obtain supportive evidence for the predicted relationships between the three institutional forces. This study enriches the literatures on institutional arbitrage and pro-market institutions with evidence from EMFs.     

BS in the boardroom: Benevolent sexism and board chair orientations

Research Summary: Though research has focused on the ascent and acceptance of female CEOs, the post‐promotion circumstances female CEOs face remain unclear. In this study, we focus on a critical post‐promotion circumstance: the board chair–CEO relationship. Drawing on the gender stereotype literature, agency theory, and stewardship theory, we posit that firms appointing a female CEO are more likely to adopt a collaboration board chair orientation and less likely to adopt a control orientation. We further predict this effect is attenuated by female board representation. Using a sample of new S&P 1500 CEOs, we find support for our predictions regarding the collaboration orientation but not the control orientation. This research provides some evidence of benevolent sexism in the boardroom, with female directors acting as a countervailing influence. Managerial Summary: Whereas the notion that females encounter a glass ceiling on their path toward CEO is well documented, the conditions female CEOs encounter after promotion are less understood. The relationship between the board chair and the CEO is one important post‐promotion condition. Board chairs can focus on monitoring and/or working together with the CEO. We suggest board chairs are more likely to work in close collaboration with female CEOs than with male CEOs. We attribute this to benevolent sexism, which explains that board chairs are more likely to collaborate with female CEOs because they view females as more conducive to, and in need of, this type of relationship. We also suggest this benevolent sexism is less prevalent when there are more females on the board.